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Abstract
Agribusiness companies operating in China are transacting in various
forms with small agricultural producers, and in doing so, transforming
the household-based agriculture in rural China. We argue that the
presence of these distinct forms and the diverging relations between
agribusiness and producers show the central importance of China’s
collective land rights. China’s unique system of land rights – featuring
collective ownership but individualized usage rights – has acted as a
powerful force in shaping interactions between agribusiness and direct
producers. It provides farmers a source of economic income as well as
political bargaining power – albeit to various degrees – and restricts
corporate actors from dispossessing farmers of their land. Because
agribusinesses are able to work with small-scale producers in order to
produce the high-scale production they need, we argue that Chinese
leaders do not need to scale up land holdings in order to modernize
agriculture. If China continues to provide land-use rights, China’s small-
scale producers can benefit from this modernization in unanticipated
ways.
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1. Introduction
What changes are currently occurring in the mode of production in
China’s agriculture? In what forms are agribusiness companies entering
agriculture and interacting with farmers? How are land, labour and
capital now controlled by corporate and individual actors, and then
organized into agricultural production? How does such control and
organization shape relationship among the actors? In this paper, we
document various forms in which agribusiness companies are transacting
with individual agricultural producers, and in doing so, transforming the
household-based agriculture in rural China. We argue that the presence
of these distinct forms and the diverging relations between agribusiness
and producers show the central importance of China’s collective land
rights. China’s unique system of land rights – featuring collective
ownership but individualized usage rights – has acted as a powerful
force in shaping interactions between agribusiness and direct producers.
It provides farmers a source of economic income as well as political
bargaining power– albeit to various degrees – and restricts corporate
actors from dispossessing farmers of their land.
2. China’s Agriculture: The Social and Political Impacts of
Agribusiness
The Household Responsibility System (HRS) started by Deng Xiaoping
in 1978 brought land use rights to rural households, providing more
leeway for farmers to select crops and market surplus production
(Kelliher, 1 992; White, 1 998; Zweig, 1 997). This new institution is
credited for bringing, nearly single-handedly, hundreds of millions of
poor farmers out of poverty – the fastest rate of rural poverty reduction
in world history. At the same time, this move also returned Chinese
agriculture to household-based production of miniscule scale and low
level of mechanization.1 Although in the years immediately following
the reform, production already began to exceed the strict boundaries of
the household in some cases – with some families hiring outside labour
and renting the land of others, for instance (Unger, 2002a) – the presence
of large-scale production and the role of agribusiness in the process of
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growing crops has been quite muted. To be sure, firms were involved in
the processing and distribution of agricultural products, but by-and-
large, in the vast majority of China, production was contained largely
within small and scattered plots of land and carried out by members of
rural households with severely constrained capital.
Subsequent stagnation in agricultural production led to widespread
calls for new measures to further increase agricultural output. Proposed
solutions include further developing and disseminating agricultural
technology, securing farmers’ land rights or even privatizing farm land to
enhance farmers’ incentives, and, more importantly and of the most
interest to this study, scaling up production to achieve economy of scale
and introducing large enterprises and modern technologies into
agriculture. Other East Asian governments such as Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan, in order to reduce productivity loss caused by land reform,
all resorted to some efforts to consolidate the overly parcelized land
resulting from their policies of land reforms (Bramall, 2004).2 Decades
after the HRS reform, the Chinese government also found itself battling
the negative legacies of that reform.
Clearly, some changes were in order for agriculture and rural China
to transcend the limitations of the HRS reform. Interestingly, in the road
map for China’s rural development, the central leadership under Deng
Xiaoping already identified the next step. In 1990, Deng articulated his
vision as the following:
The reform and development of China’s socialist agriculture, from the
long- term perspective, requires two great leaps (liangge feiyue
). The first leap is dismantling peoples’ communes and
implementing the Household Responsibility reform. This is a great
advance and should be kept in the long term. The second leap is
meeting the needs of scientific agriculture and socialized production,
properly developing scaled-up operation, and developing the
collective economy.
(Deng, 1993: 355)
These “Two Leaps” have since become the guiding vision for the
central government’s agricultural policies. Deng further elaborated that,
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“the rural economy eventually needs to become collectivized (jitihua
) and coordinated (jiyuehua ) … agricultural modernization
is impossible if each household works on its own.” (Deng, 2004: 1 349-
1 350) Since Deng had completed the first leap, for Deng’s successors,
the assignment was clear: the time has come to make the second leap.
The irony, however, is that the two leaps implied apparently
contradictory directions: the first decollectivizes and sets agriculture
back to household-based, small-holding operations, while the second
tries to re-collectivize and scale up operation beyond the household
boundaries. Thus, China’s central government had to walk a fine line in
order to start the second leap without undoing the first. At the core of the
first leap, the HRS, is the household-based land use rights system that
restored farmers’ incentives and protected their interests. This would
therefore remain a central institution in China’s agricultural
modernization programme.
The policy shift from HRS to the second leap started in the mid-
1990s. While Deng only vaguely mentioned “agricultural
modernization” as a part of the long-term goals of Four Modernizations,
the central leadership under Jiang Zemin started to articulate
“agricultural modernization” in more concrete terms and propose policy
measures through a series of policy statements, starting from the Ninth
Five-Year Plan passed in 1996, to Jiang’s report to the 15th Party
Congress in 1997, and culminating in the 1998 document of “Decisions
by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Several
Key Issues in Rural and Agricultural Works.” The central leadership
clearly stated the goal of agricultural modernization (nongye xiandaihua
) as to make the transition from traditional agriculture to
modern agriculture and from uncoordinated and low-scale operation
(cufangshi jingying ) to coordinated and large-scale
operation (jiyueshi jingying ). The central government
characterized a modernized agriculture as commercialized (shangpinhua
), specialized (zhuanyehua ), scaled up (guimohua
), and furthermore, standardized (biaozhunhua ) and
internationalized (guojihua ).
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The central leadership also identified agricultural vertical
integration (chanyehua ) as the main venue to achieve
agricultural modernization.3 Vertical integration here means two parallel
processes: First, it means the scaling-up of production of a crop in a
region, because without a large enough volume of harvest of a crop,
further processing and marketing of it will not be economically viable.4
Second, it means integrating cultivation of a crop with the processing
and marketing of it and its derivatives. The central government believes
vertical integration helps to bring farmers into markets and bring modern
technologies into farming. At the centre of the government’s vertical
integration campaign is to promote “dragon head” agribusiness
companies (longtou qiye ) as the main vehicle for vertical
integration (Waldron, 2006; Waldron, Brown and Longworth, 2003).
Central and local governments bestow “dragon head” status to
agribusiness companies. The designated dragon head enterprises can
receive some forms of government support, such as easier access to
loans from state banks. But as the criteria of designating dragon head
enterprises become more lenient down the administrative hierarchy,
local dragon head enterprises often receive nothing more than just the
title. As a result, agribusiness companies have proliferated in recent
years.
The second leap has indeed started and China’s agricultural
development has entered a new phase – one could say the fourth
revolution since 1949, if we trace back to the land reform, the
collectivization, and the HRS. Yet, this major change in rural China has
barely been discussed in English-language literature. As Waldron (2006)
points out, the fast growth of agribusiness is “one of the most important
but unreported developments in Chinese agriculture in recent years.”
(Waldron, 2006: 292) This paper intends to start the discussion on this
new phase of rural development by first investigating a central force in
this process of agricultural modernization through vertical integration:
agribusiness. We should also point out that before the central
government made it a policy priority, a spontaneous process of
transforming the household-based agriculture already emerged through
the rise of entrepreneurial farmers, who hired labour and rented land to
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expand their specialized commercial farming beyond the household
boundary. Here, however, we will focus on the growth of agribusiness,
including the role of agribusiness in the rise of agrarian capitalism in
China, the multiple pathways it takes, and the changes it brings to rural
society. It is based primarily on fieldwork conducted in 2007 and 2009,
as well as insights from previous fieldwork in other provinces and
secondary sources.
With this typology (see Table 1 ), we find variations along two
dimensions. First, the control over – and use of – labour and land
changes. Across these forms, agribusiness firms have varying degrees of
control over labour and land vis-à-vis direct producers. Second, with
changes in the control over land and/or labour, social relationship
between actors also change. Most notably, the power relationship
between rural resident (whether acting as a contractor or a farm worker)
and agricultural firm is strikingly different in these five forms. Because
this shifting power relationship is based on the agribusiness’s varying
degrees of control over land and labour – but primarily land, the
institution of land rights plays a crucial role in shaping such relationship.
We argue that the collective land rights system in rural China allows
rural residents to resist agribusiness from acquiring more control over
farm land and greater domination over them. With this in mind, we
sharply disagree with growing calls to eliminate this institution and
privatize farm land in China.
Form 1: Commercial Farmers
One of the first types of expanded production, that of “commercial
farmer”, emerged within a few years of reform (Unger, 2002b). While,
as we noted earlier, commercial farming is not new in China (Huang,
1990), commercial farming by rural households was eliminated under
collectivization. Its reemergence depended on the marketization of
agricultural products, without which the commercial households could
then neither sell their crops nor buy grain. Although many rural
households participated in product market by selling their surplus grain
or the economic crop they grow in addition to subsistence grain, their
subsistence is not commercialized – they relied on their own land and
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Table 1 Relationships between Agribusiness and Farmers in China:
A Typology
Form Role for
agribusiness
Role for direct
producers
Harvest Class relations
Commercial
farmer
Purchase
product,
training
Work
independently
on allocated
family land
All for
commercial
exchange
Direct producers
can be
dominated by
purchasers
through unfair
terms of trade.
Contract
farmer
Form
purchasing
contracts,
provide
technical
support
Work on
allocated
family land
to fulfill
company
contracts
Sold to
contracting
companies
Direct producers
are dominated by
the company, but
retain some
flexibility.
Semi-
proletarian
with Chinese
characteristics
Form bases
through leasing
village
farmland,
hire villagers
Work on
collective
land rented
to companies
as company
employees
Belongs to
the company
Direct producers
are dominated by
the company but
enjoy a degree of
entitlement.
Semi-
proletarian
farm workers
Form bases
through leasing
wasteland,
hire migrant
labourers
Work on
company land
as company
employees, but
have allocated
land at home
Belongs to
the company
Direct producers
are dominated by
the company, but
have family land
as fall-back
option.
Proletarian
farm workers
Form bases
through leasing
wasteland,
hire landless
labourers
Landless,
work on
company land
as employees
Belongs to
the company
Complete
domination by
the company
over direct
producers.
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grain for subsistence needs and used commercial farming to earn cash
income which supplemented their livelihoods.
By commercial farmer here, we refer to rural households who grow
crops (mostly non-staple, economic crops) predominantly for
commercial exchange, and satisfy their basic needs through buying grain
on markets instead of growing it. The commercialization of the
satisfaction of subsistence brings important changes to the peasant
households. While still relying on family labour and contracted family
land, these households derive their subsistence from markets, which
often link them directly with remote actors and social processes that lie
beyond the local community. They may still be dominated by outside
actors through unfair terms of trade, but they are usually not directly
subjected to the domination of local actors, such as an extractive local
state.
Mr Chen, a commercial farmer living in the rural areas of Simao
Municipality, Yunnan province, is one of many examples. Mr Chen has
shifted from growing corn on his farmland to exclusively growing coffee
beans. He and his family’s shift from growing corn to growing coffee
beans occurred over a series of steps. At first, while Chen and his family
tended the corn on their own plot, Chen himself worked in an ad hoc
manner at Beigui, a local coffee producing TVE, where he earned
essential cash to supplement subsistence farming, and also learned the
skill of growing coffee. Soon afterwards, just as Nestle became active in
the area as a buyer of coffee beans, Chen switched from working for
Beigui to growing coffee beans on his family’s land. Soon, the family,
like most of its neighbours, switched completely out of growing corn,
and now exclusively grows coffee beans on its 20 mu of land5. Then, as
now, the family sells exclusively to Nestle, which has proven to be a
dependable buyer, purchasing coffee beans at the international price
(some computer savvy farmers even check the international price on the
Internet).
By completely given up subsistence farming, Chen and his family
have accepted numerous risks, many of which are out of the family’s
control, such as the price of coffee which is based on global markets.
However, while the fluctuation of the price of coffee beans reportedly
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has hurt the economic interests of other coffee farmers, Chen reports that
such fluctuation does not hurt him much, since he makes at least some
money each year – enough to purchase grain and other needs. Chen’s
family has now invested in preliminary processing equipment, with
which they shell, clean, dry and split coffee beans before delivering
them to Nestle. Cash from coffee sales allows the family to send their
two children to boarding school in the municipal seat.
In order for them to shift out of grain production into an commercial
crop, most rural families, like the Chens, require some type of outside
impetus to help them learn how to grow new economic crops, provide
needed capital and most of all secure a market that mitigates risk. In
some cases, when roads (even humble dirt roads) link local areas to
marketing towns and beyond, middlemen can come in to purchase such
crops, inducing households to increase their production. Oftentimes,
however, entrepreneurs and companies provide the needed access to
skill, capital and market. Private enterprises, whether domestic
companies or foreign ventures, represent channels through which
subsistence peasants can shift into commercial farming. However,
sometimes, especially for very poor farmers, the state is the only actor
with the capability and resources to serve as an outside impetus shifting
peasants to commercial farmers. With commercial farming, agricultural
production, although still relying on the household as the unit of
production, changes from self-reliance and subsistence-based production
to market-oriented and commercialized agriculture. These commercial
farmers also enter into new sets of relationships with individual,
corporate, and state actors, who often mediate their interactions with
markets. In such relations, agribusiness firms exert no control on land or
labour that belongs to the direct producers. The commercial farmers are
usually not under any direct domination or exploitation, other than the
unfavourable terms of trade they may endure on the open market.
Form 2: Contract Farmers
In dealing with independent commercial farmers, agribusiness has to
face the uncertainty of fluctuating supply caused by farmers’ shifting in
and out of a commercial crop – sometimes dramatically – when prices
60 John Donaldson and Forrest Zhang
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations:
An International Journal 1(1) ♦ 2015
for that crop change. One solution to that problem adopted by many
companies is to formally establish contractual relationship with farmers,
usually in a contiguous area. In this relationship, the company typically
provides farmers with technology, training, service, and in many cases
start-up capital. Although the farming households retain control over
their household land and their own labour, in return for company
support, they sign a contract, generally locking them into a selling price,
with the promise to sell their entire harvest to the company. We call these
the “contract farmers”.
One of the many examples that we discovered of this type of
production is Xinchang Foods, the Shandong poultry meat processing
company, whose story we relayed at the beginning. In addition to the
poultry processing facilities, this company also has two plants for
processing microwavable food, such as TV dinners. Established in 1988,
the company now reportedly employs more than 8,000 people, and has
revenue in excess of RMB 800 million yuan. As mentioned earlier, the
company estimates that about 40 per cent of its production comes from
such a base formed through contracts directly with the farmers.6 In doing
so, the company contracts out with approximately 10,000 households in
the surrounding areas. The company guarantees a minimum, or
“protective” price (baohu jia ), pays the farmers immediately
upon delivery and has overall established a solid relationship with the
farmers over the course of the previous decade.
Farmers who produce under contract with this company confirm
much of the company’s point of view, agreeing that the company
provides inputs such as animal feed and technical and safety training (in
part to combat bird flu). For instance, Mr Zhao’s farmland contains three
duck coops and more than 8,600 ducks which he husbands, selling the
full-grown ducks (after 46 days, he notes) back to the company. Through
his association with the company, Mr Zhao reported that he can earn
RMB 1500 yuan on average each month. However, he argues that the
company, because of its size and market position, holds the
preponderance of the power, which it uses to hold down the purchasing
price to RMB 1 yuan for each grown duck Mr Zhao and his family raise.
Mr Zhao lives in an urbanizing area and his family land has shrunk from
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1 .7 mu per capita to about 0.3 mu, due to land expropriation by the state
for urban expansion (which he has only been inadequately compensated
for, he adds). Now, instead of growing grain as they had previously, Mr
Zhao and his family dedicate most of their land to raising ducklings,
retaining a small plot for growing melons and other self-consumed
vegetables. In fact, given their limited land, animal husbandry might be
one of a few viable options in the agriculture sector that the Zhao family
has left. In his relationship with Xinchang Foods, although farmers like
Mr Zhao still retain their entitlement to land use rights provided by the
village collective and are not subjected to personal domination in the
labouring process, they nevertheless have relegated much of the control
over the production and its final products to the company, as the
company now sets the parameters of production and has the monopsony
over their products. The company also facilitated the specialization and
scaling-up of agricultural production by organizing tens of thousands of
formerly scattered and isolated farmer households into specialized,
coordinated, and standardized production.
Like the commercial farmers who have departed from subsistence
agriculture and now rely on production of commercial crops, these
contract farmers usually grow economic crops exclusively for
commercial exchange, transact with outside actors, and depend for their
subsistence on the market. The two differ, however, on one key aspect:
due to their lack of access to capital, market or skill, contract farmers
have to enter into formal contractual relationship with a more powerful
and resourceful corporate actor. By providing them with the needed
capital, skill, and/or market access, the corporate actor is thus able to
reduce contract farmers’ negotiating power and profit margin. The
farmer commits legally to selling his product only to the contracting
company. In such a relationship, farmers only provide labour and land.
In contrast, commercial farmers enjoy a market-set price for their
products, instead of one dictated by the contracting company, and have
the flexibility of selling to the highest bidder at harvest time.
Theoretically, contract farmers do enjoy one advantage: they can shield
themselves from market risks by obtaining from the company the
protective price for their products.7 In our fieldwork, we routinely found
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farmers, sometimes even the local governments, try to obtain protective
prices from the contracting company, often to no avail.
Due to their domination by corporate actors, although contract
farmers like Mr Zhao’s are probably better off economically than they
were under subsistence farming, they are typically not as well off as
independent commercial farmers. Partly in response to their
unfavourable position vis-à-vis the companies, contract farmers have
often neglected the contract and sold their harvest to other purchasers
who, without bearing production costs the contracting company
incurred, offered higher prices. This has created a phenomenon known
as the “middleman problem” – referring to itinerant middlemen who
drive around and secretly purchase products from companies’ production
bases. In other cases, according to one report, contract farmers tried to
deflate cost by cutting corners in the production process, resulting in
product defects (Li, 2008). Due to these difficulties, we believe that
contract farming as a form of agrarian capitalism is unstable and likely
to be transient, changing to either commercial farming or to the form we
discuss next.8
Form 3: Semi­proletarian Farm Workers with Chinese Characteristics
From a contracting company’s perspective, a long-term solution to the
middleman problem can only come from gaining greater control over the
growing and harvesting process and changing farmers’ incentive
structure. In practice, agribusiness firms establish production bases by
renting the land (use rights) from the collective owner, the village, and
hiring village residents, who, as members of the collective, are entitled
to land use rights, as company employees to work on the land. In some
cases, rural households still work on the piece of household land
allocated to them by the collective – although now rented to the
company base – growing whatever the company asks them to grow. In
other cases, land is consolidated and household boundaries erased,
farmers simply work for the company on company land. Even when
farmers continue to work on the allocated household land, a profound
change has happened: they are now only providing labour in the
production process, while the land use rights – and the right to dispose of
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harvest from the land – are controlled by the company.
To this form, we add the appendage “with Chinese characteristics”
because we argue that without the unique institution of collective land
ownership and individualized land use rights in rural China, this form
might not come to pass. The companies that are forming the base
typically establish the contractual relationship with the village collective
authorities, not with the individual farmer as is the case with the contract
farmer. Because the collective land ownership restricts village
authorities from disenfranchising rural residents from their land, it also
restricts companies from denying rural residents jobs on company
production bases. Without such a restriction, an enclosure movement led
by these companies could easily have thrown many farmers off their
land and into the army of reserve labour. In this way, farmers become
semi-proletarian, in that they still have an entitlement to collective land
(and in fact often receive rent for renting out this means of production to
the company), yet at the same time, they have to sell their labour to the
company for wages. In a sense, these farmers trade their land use rights
for jobs. Their entitlement to collective land gives them entitlement to
company jobs, and thus, in one sense, they “own” or have rights to their
jobs in a way unlike proletarianized workers.
One of the examples of this form, Taiwan’s Qianhui Flower
Company, based in Chenggong County, Yunnan, rents 70 per cent of its
land from collectives through contracts of at least seven years. It then
pays members of the household a monthly wage to grow and harvest the
flowers on their own land. This company currently has 10 such bases
throughout Yunnan, giving it different environments in which to grow a
wide variety of flowers. This company emphasized that once the
household is contracted, the farmer cannot individually withdraw their
land from the arrangement, because the land is contracted through the
village committee to the base. Qianhui does not have a big problem with
middlemen. Considering selling the product to outsiders to be a criminal
issue, Qianhui works with local law enforcement to enforce their
contracts with farmers.
Although these semi-proletarian farm workers with Chinese
characteristics do benefit economically from this type of arrangement,
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they clearly lose autonomy and the greater economic benefit that
commercial or contract farmers have. Compared to contract farmers,
semi-proletarian farm workers not only have relinquished use rights over
their collective land (although they often receive rent for that), they are
also subjected to tighter company control in the production process. As a
result of both, unlike contract farmers, they totally lose control over the
harvest. While the company pays wages to farm workers, it also takes
profits from the surplus that would otherwise belong to the farmers.
Farmers are also largely deprived of the opportunities to undercut
company’s domination by selling to middlemen for higher margins.
Despite these shortcomings, when rural residents lack capital and know-
how, and will often benefit financially by making this sort of
arrangement with agribusiness. From the company’s point of view, this
form is a relatively painless way to obtain control over farm land and
overcome the middleman problem. However, companies have also found
other ways to obtain even greater control over their employees, the
production process and the harvest.
Form 4: Semi­proletarian Farm Workers
Under this form the company owns or otherwise controls the land of its
production bases, and hires rural workers. The farm worker, who
migrated to the company’s production base, still possesses use rights
over his or her own land, but their land is elsewhere – and has usually
been rented out to relatives, neighbours or entrepreneurs. Hence, the
labourer is classified as “Semi-proletarian Farm Workers”: they sell
labour for wages, yet still retain access to some means of production,
although not directly used.
The Dahongpo Coffee Plantation in western Yunnan province
controls a base of some 7,000 mu, of which 4,500 mu is currently
cultivated with coffee plants. The company leases land that was
previously classified as wasteland – mostly on mountain slopes – for its
base with long-term leases that expire in 2030. The company got capital
support from the Bank of Agriculture and an ear-marked World Bank
loan to invest in infrastructure building. The local government was also
involved in the early years in attracting poor peasants to come and grow
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coffee on the base. The entire process of growing and harvesting is
tightly controlled by the company. Like most others of its kind, this
company provides land, training, fertilizer, pesticides, seeds and other
inputs. The company has a hierarchical organizational structure in place
to supervise farm workers. The company passes down orders through
this hierarchy to farm workers on every production procedure, ranging
from when to apply fertilizer and pesticide to when to start harvesting.
Materials such as seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides are also distributed
from the company, through the teams and down to each worker family.
The company does not charge rent from the workers, but establishes a
production quota for each mu of land. The company and farm worker
split the within-quota harvest on a 6:4 ratio, and 100 per cent of the sales
from above-quota harvest belongs to the farm worker. Company
representatives acknowledge that the harvest belongs to the company,
but argue that the company chooses to give workers a share in the
harvest – in lieu of wage – in order to attract workers. The company’s
control of land and close monitoring of the entire production process
means that farm workers here have much less flexibility in comparison
to the contract farmer, who work on their own land. Farm workers not
only have great difficulties in “stealing” the harvest and sell it to
middlemen for higher prices, as the company can relatively easily
determine the output from each household’s plot, they also face dire
consequences if caught doing so – the company considers such selling to
outsiders theft of company assets and will kick the workers off the farm
as punishment.
This company leaves the impression of a benevolent employer. Not
only it gives farm workers a generous cut in the proceeds from the
harvest, it has also provided land for migrant farm workers to build their
own housing (this is also out of necessity, so that workers can live in the
field and tend the crops more closely). The easy availability of
“undeveloped land” in the area and the relative tight labour supply (the
area has a large minority population, who are less receptive of the idea
of becoming hired employees) means that the company has to offer
better terms to attract migrant labourers, whose access to entitled
collective land at home also serves to strengthen their bargaining power.
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Many companies that operate production bases in this form are
constrained in a similar way: the large area of land they can gain control
of is rarely prime farm land, but reclaimed wasteland of various sorts,
located in remote areas, another legacy of China’s collective land
system. During interviews, company representatives repeatedly stressed
that had they had access to better farm land that is not burdened with a
population of entitled villagers, they would not have bothered with the
wasteland they currently used. When facing the choice of renting
collectively owned land and then hiring villagers versus opening up
wasteland and hiring migrant labourers, many companies eschewed the
former for the complex relations it creates between companies, village
authorities, and villagers. From the farm worker’s point of view,
however, while the company provides job opportunities that would not
otherwise exist, their power base is quite constrained, resting in the form
of escape clause – the land back home that the worker retains.
Form 5: Proletarian Farm Workers
The final form discussed here that has emerged in China is similar to the
previous type, except that the farm workers are landless labourers
without major viable alternative livelihoods. The Beigui Coffee
Company started off in the 1980s as a TVE under the prefecture Supply
and Sales Cooperative (SSC, gongxiao she ) in Yunnan’s Simao
Prefecture (now Pu’er Municipality), and reformed to a stock-holding
company in 1998, with the SSC holding the majority stake, and workers
each holding shares. Of the 10,000 mu base that the company controls,
half is rented from farmers and half was previously classified wasteland
that the company leased long-term (50 years) from the village collective.
The operation involves 2,000 farmers, most of whom are stable farm
workers who move their entire families from poor areas, primarily
Zhaotong Municipality in northeastern Yunnan, one of China’s poorest
regions.9 However, unlike the previous forms, the company encourages
peasants to give up their land rights in their home villages and to obtain
a local permanent resident permit, which, however, does not grant them
any entitlement to collective land. These relocated migrant workers thus
become second-class citizens in their adopted villages – they are
Changes and Transformations in China’s Agriculture and Rural Sector 67
CCPS Vol. 1 No. 1 (April 2015)
members of the villages, their children can go to local schools, they have
most of the political rights of any other villager, but do not have access
to collectively-owned land.
This arrangement makes the farm workers closely dependent on the
company. Workers can earn income from three sources: first, for each
mu of coffee shrubs under their cultivation, they earn a labour wage of
RMB 15 yuan; second, as a bonus to give workers more incentive, the
company also pays a weight-based purchasing fee for the coffee beans
workers yield; and third, workers can also earn a picking fee during peak
harvesting season if they are hired to do picking for the company. Like
Dahongpo, at Beigui, the company also takes total control over the
production process. Given the larger size of Beigui (2000 workers in 600
households, compared to 600 workers in 168 households at Dahongpo),
the company organizes their production in a three-tiered hierarchy:
company – farms – teams. While team leaders are selected from farm
workers, managerial staff at the farm level is full-time employees of the
company. Overall, the company is supervised with more than 30 salaried
staff, managing the production process in a top-down manner.
The company argues that the farmers as a result are far better off
than they were. Given that these farmers are from one of China’s poorest
areas, and that they do migrate to Baoshan voluntarily, that is likely to be
true. The company estimates farm workers earn between RMB 20,000-
30,000 yuan per household, which is far higher than the net rural income
of any county in Zhaotong prefecture. While these poor farm workers
likely benefit financially to some degree and even emerge from poverty,
in terms of political and social power, they are the weakest among the
forms that we have highlighted here. Since land acts as a type of
insurance policy on which poor farmers can often fall back as they
migrate or take other risks in order to improve their livelihoods, the fact
that Beigui asks farmers to switch their household registrations, in effect
giving up their rights to land, makes them unusually dependent on the
company and base. On the other hand, the company’s need to attract
farmers to work on the base limits the extent to which they can exploit
this dependence.
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More interestingly, these migrant farm workers are relocated in
villages where farmers have their own land usage rights. Therefore, in
that same village, we find two classes of farmers live right next to each
other, yet in contrasting conditions. Most of the relocated landless farm
workers live at the centre of the village in houses built by Beigui, with
some living sparsely in the field – also in company built housing. Other
residents, on the other hand, who have become wealthy growing
vegetables and other commercial crops, live in self-built houses on their
own land, surround by coffee groves. Although these two groups of
villagers do socialize with each other, a sense of distinction between the
two is palpable through our conversations with both.
3. Agribusiness, Scaling­up and the Modernization of
China’s Agriculture
In some rural areas in today’s China, the central government’s vision of
a “second leap” into a modern agriculture has become a reality. The
household-based, small-holding agricultural production reinstated by the
HRS has been transformed into specialized, commercialized, vertically
integrated, and larger-scale agriculture that is competitive on export
market. Shouguang County in Shandong province, for example, boasts
the largest vegetable production base and vegetable trading market in the
country, with hundreds of long-haul trucks departing daily to ship
vegetables to all corners of the country. The entire county’s farmland is
fully covered by greenhouses for growing vegetables. Chenggong
County in Yunnan, where agriculture has shifted entirely to commercial
flower and vegetable production, now houses the largest flower trading
and auction market in Asia, ships fresh cut flowers to markets in
neighbouring Asian countries as well as the United States, and is
projected to become in 10 to 15 years the biggest flower producer and
exporter in Asia, if not in the world (Bradsher, 2006).
The diverse ways agribusiness enter agriculture and interact with
direct producers, as we documented above, show how distinctive
characteristics of China’s rural institutions create unique patterns in
China’s path toward agrarian capitalism. The relationship between
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agribusiness – representing capital from local, urban, or even
international origins – and direct producers will become the most
important relationship in the new scaled-up, vertically integrated,
modern agricultural sector and the relationship that shapes China’s rural
society in coming years. Our research underscores how this relationship
is shaped by the system of collective land ownership and individualized
land use rights of rural China. This system has proven to be not only
adaptable, but in fact, conducive to development of rural markets and
agricultural modernization. The separation of individualized land use
rights from collective ownership has allowed land rental markets to
develop rapidly. Land rental markets then facilitate the circulation of
land and consolidation of parcelized land into larger operations, paving
the road for scaled-up production needed by agribusiness.
On the other hand, the collective ownership protects agricultural
producers – to various degrees – against the domination, exploitation
and dispossession by outside capital. Nearly all of the companies that we
interviewed expressed a desire to expand their production bases. While
China’s paradoxical lack of skilled and educated labour constrains to a
certain extent the ability of companies to achieve this, the primary
barrier to expanding bases is the lack of land – or, put in another way,
the difficulty in wresting control over collective land from rural
households. In fact, many companies and entrepreneurs that have formed
bases have to do so on previously unproductive land that they
themselves have opened up. For many companies however, the lack of
undeveloped space means that they must expand through using land that
is currently farmed by small rural households. In many other countries,
in such battles pitting powerful corporations against unorganized small
farmers, the rise of agrarian capitalism proceeded in a Grapes of Wrath
fashion, with capital owners consolidating land through dispossessing
smallholding farmers. In China, farmers’ protected land rights under the
collective ownership provide them nearly the only piece of political
power over the companies. As a result, agricultural modernization in
rural China so far has progressed in the more equitable ways as we
described above and has not created an expanding army of landless
vagabonds.
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To be sure, there were cases of companies throwing around their
political weight. For instance, village collectives can commit farmers to
renting out their land to company bases, one pathway (Form 3) to the
creation of semi- proletarian farm workers. One entrepreneur used his
pull with local authorities to have forested land reclassified as wasteland,
allowing him to purchase it from the village and create a privately
owned and operated commercial orchard. He then used help from his
brother-in-law, who was the village head, to form the base on favourable
terms. Despite the use of company power, however, in no case did we
encounter land grabs in order to form production bases, even though this
would solve the shortage of farmland, a major constraint for companies
and entrepreneurs, who would doubtlessly benefit from it. Some
companies in Yunnan, unhappy with the restrictions they faced under
China’s collective land system, have in fact ventured into Laos, Vietnam
and Myanmar to acquire land and expand their production.
Over thirty years ago, the Household Responsibility reform
established the institution of household-based land use rights under
collective ownership, giving Chinese farmers an economically
inalienable entitlement to land – a crucial resource that is denied farmers
of most other countries. Indeed, this institution was so important and
effective in restoring farmers’ incentives that within a few short years
after the reform started, poverty rates plummeted. Today, even as many
farmers turn to – and even prosper from – off-farm jobs, most
manoeuvre to maintain their land rights back home, for these rights
provide a type of insurance policy that diversifies income and protects
against misfortune. However, critics worried that Deng Xiaoping’s
reforms would permanently condemn China and her farmers to
inefficient, low-tech, small-scale, traditional agricultural production.
Indeed, these shortcomings of the household responsibility system,
together with policy changes unfavourable to the agricultural sector,
have resulted in rural stagnation in the 1900s. As a result, the
government seeks ways of expanding production through vertical
integration and other forms of modernization. At their base, these plans
and approaches require an increase in scale of production. In this
process, China’s central government faced a crucial dilemma: the
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productive potential of these small plots of land have apparently been
reached, but how to modernize agriculture without taking away farmers’
household-based land use rights? This paper has revealed one of China’s
solutions to this dilemma, one that allows agricultural production to
expand and modernize without eliminating the crucial institution that
benefited hundreds of millions of farmers. The collective land ownership
has proven to be a flexible system that allows agribusiness and scale
production to grow through a variety of forms, while maintaining a
modicum of rights and material benefits for China’s farmers.
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1 . There are numerous areas in China, especially in wheat growing areas,
where mechanized farming still prevails.
2. It is, however, a debatable issue as to whether land consolidation really
leads to productivity gains. If farm size increases, but not to the extent of
allowing mechanization and not associated with increased labour input,
land productivity may actually decline due to reduced per unit labour input
and a lower intensity of land-use. Land consolidation has to be carried out
in certain specific ways – e.g., moving land to more efficient users – to
increase productivity. See Q. Forrest Zhang,, “Retreat from equality or
advance toward efficiency? Land markets and inequality in rural
Zhejiang”, China Quarterly, Vol. 1 95, 2008, pp. 535-557, for a discussion.
3 . Throughout this chapter, we use “agricultural modernization”, or “modern
agriculture”, to refer to the mode of agricultural production as described by
the set of policy goals stated in the above, including specialization, vertical
integration, corporatization, commercialization, and large scale. We,
however, refrain from making claims about whether this modernized
agriculture is necessarily more efficient, which is an empirical question
that needs to be answered with data.
4. The scaling up here, however, does not necessarily mean production needs
to be done at a supra-household level. It could simply mean more
households in a region shift to growing a certain crop, so the scale of
production for that crop increases in a region.
5. 1 mu = 0.0667 hectares.
6. A further 40-50 per cent of their production comes from a more formal
contract with village governments, Form 3 in our typology. Thus, this case,
as with many others, produces through multiple forms.
7. In their survey, Guo, Jolly, and Zhu (2007) found that only 27.3 per cent of
contracts in their survey featured a price floor, with 23 per cent based on a
fixed price. The remaining 44 per cent of these contracts were based on the
market price, offering farmers little protection.
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8. This is consistent with a survey conducted by China’s Ministry of
Agriculture that reveals among the different types of relationships between
farmer and firm, the proportion of contract farming relationships dropped
from 70.8 per cent to 49.0 per cent. See Niu (2002), also reported in Guo,
Jolly, and Zhu (2007).
9. Mr Chen, described above, is an exception, having worked for years for
Beigui as a temporary worker.
References
Bradsher, Keith (2006). Bouquet of roses may have note: “Made in China”. The
NewYork Times. New York.
Bramall, Chris (2004). Chinese land reform in long-run perspective and in the
wider East Asian context. Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 4, pp. 1 07-
141 .
Deng, Xiaoping (1993). Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [collected works of Deng
Xiaoping], Vol. 3 . Beij ing: Renmin Chubanshe (The People’s Publishing
House).
Deng, Xiaoping (2004). Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975­1997 [chronicles of Deng
Xiaoping, 1 975-1997], Beij ing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe (The
Central Archives Press).
Huang, Philip C.C. (1 990). The peasant family and rural development in the
Yangzi Delta, 1350­1988. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
Kelliher, Daniel (1 992). Peasant power in China: The era of rural reform,
1979­ 1989. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Li, Hongbin (2008). Zai nongye chanyehua fazhan zhong peiyu he tigao
nongmin zuzhihua chengdu yanjiu [a study on nurturing and strengthening
the organization of farmers through developing agricultural vertical
integration] , Nongye Jingji Wenti [issues in agricultural economy], pp. 99-
102.
Unger, Jonathan (2002a). Chapter 5: Disbanding collective agriculture. In: J.
Unger (ed.), The transformation of rural China. Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, pp. 95-11 8.
Unger, Jonathan (2002b). The transformation of rural China. Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe.
Waldron, Scott (2006). State sector reform and agriculture in China. The China
Quarterly, Vol. 1 86, pp. 277-294.
74 John Donaldson and Forrest Zhang
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations:
An International Journal 1(1) ♦ 2015
Waldron, Scott, Colin Brown and John W. Longworth (2003). Rural
development in China: Insights from the beef industry. Aldershot: Ashgate.
White, Lynn (1998). Unstately power. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Zhang, Forrest Q. (2008). Retreat from equality or advance toward efficiency?
Land markets and inequality in rural Zhejiang. China Quarterly, Vol. 1 95,
pp. 535-557.
Zweig, David (1997). Freeing China’s farmers: Rural restructuring in the
reform era. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
